


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FORCE XXI--HEAVY TASK FORCE BATTLE COMMAND DYNAMICS

**A Monograph
by**

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Infantry**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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
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
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
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I -- INTRODUCTION

Battle command is the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions at the least cost to soldiers. It begins in the training a commander provides for his command and it ends with the successful redeployment and recovery of the command in preparation for the next operation. It includes visualizing the current state and desired future state and then deciding how to get from one to the other at the least cost to the soldier. These decisions include assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.

FM 100-5 Operations

The leaders of today's Army seek to set the conditions for success, for the Army of tomorrow. Today's National Security Strategy (NSS) is based on engagement and enlargement with a small but capable force.¹ However, emerging technology continues to blur the lines between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. As the Army continues to shrink in size, it seeks exponential improvements in capabilities through utilization of emerging technology and enhanced battle command.

Technology dramatically alters the way armies will fight in the future. Current military theorists, such as Dr. James J. Schneider, postulate that enhanced mobility, lethality, and agility, enable an army equipped with modern technology to accomplish the same mission that in the past required a much larger force.² Technology's impact on war is not merely on armament, but all aspects of military operations.

Technology modifies the battlefield dimensions of time and space. It continues to increase the standoff distance of weapon systems. As a result of increased capabilities the battlefield is larger requiring less ground force on the field of battle. In other words, the

battlefield dimension of space has increased. New technology is also changing the dimension of time on the battlefield.

Improved communication at all levels facilitates real time command and control at greater distances. Desert Storm demonstrated the immense amount of data available to the modern commander.³ Great strides are being made in the refinement of data provided to the commander.⁴ Yet, data must still be synthesized, analyzed, and organized into useful information. Historically, the commander has relied upon his staff to fulfill this function. The commander's primary focus, in the future as in the past, is the fight. The commander's battle staff is a critical enabling force. It either enhances or distracts from the commander's ability to integrate successfully and synchronize combat power and combat multipliers.

The current battle staff is a Napoleonic era model overlaid on a modern army force structure.⁵ Lessons learned, collected, and analyzed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) indicate that significant systemic problems exist in the heavy task force, battle staff's ability to synchronize and integrate combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) with combat maneuver elements.⁶ Only by successful synchronization of these crucial elements can the commander achieve the required synergistic leveraging effect of combat multipliers.⁷ Most task forces arrive at the training centers without the benefit of a trained battle staff.⁸ Lessons learned indicate that today's heavy task force battle staff organization has difficulty handling the tempo of current Army operations. What about the tempo of the future?

TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations, points out that the staff of tomorrow must be a robust, highly trained, professional organization that is capable of effectively and efficiently synthesizing data into useful information while maintaining the tempo of real time operations.⁹ The evolution of the military staff in the past has been in response to

technological advances. More often than not, staff changes were mandated by failure in battle. Cohen and Gooch in their book Military Misfortunes, identify three major causes of military failure: the failure to learn, anticipate, and adapt.¹⁰ Now is the time to explore, examine, and analyze requirements for change. If force XXI is to work, the battle staff must take a larger load off the commander so he is free to exercise his genius. The heavy task force battle staff must be capable of sustained operations over long periods of time. Staff organizations must evolve in pace with technology to maximize battle command effectiveness in force XXI.

ASSUMPTIONS.

The author made several specific assumptions in writing this paper. First, technological advances as currently projected for force XXI will occur. Second, that the United States will continue its policy of power projection and engagement around the globe. Third, the gains sought in battle command efficiency are intertwined with the dynamics of technology, leadership, and organization.

SCOPE.

Just as, the commander on the battlefield is limited by the dimensions of time and space, so is this monograph. It focuses specifically on battle command of heavy task forces. It concentrates on the organizational dynamic of battle command between the commander and his staff. It analyzes the current heavy task force battle staff organization in light of projected battle command requirements. The goal of this paper is to identify battle command problems and solutions in order to assist the Army in meeting the battle command challenges of force XXI and the mobile strike force concept.

"The essence of this force (Mobile Strike Force [MSF]) is digitally linked, highly mobile, tactical units that achieve increased lethality through better communications and improved probability of kill (pK) and probability of hit (pH) inherent in the systems reaching the field in 1998. Additionally, this force will be more survivable as a function of speed, lethality, digital communications (IFF capable), and improved passive means including better battle command. This force will achieve previously impossible rates of operational tempo stemming from higher leader to led ratios, digital links, and a fully modernized logistics system. The key limiting factor of this force will be human endurance rather than either logistics or the capability of weapons systems."¹¹ (Emphasis added)

OVERVIEW.

This paper examines battle command in relation to three dynamics: technology, leadership, and organization. A historical overview provides insight into the linkage between battle command and its dynamics. A brief case study on battle command by Napoleon then sets the stage for an analysis of the current heavy task force staff's ability to meet the demands of present and future battle command.

II. -- A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF BATTLE COMMAND DYNAMICS

Throughout the history of mankind, the sanction of force has been elemental to the existence of social organizations... physical force, or the threat of it, has been applied to the resolution of social and political problems since man formed the first primitive tribal group. That force, orchestrated as the situation demands, has continued to persist ... the art of command ... has many diverse functions ... to do with forming, organizing, equipping ... training ... transporting, committing, controlling, and coordinating [soldiers] actions.

Ancient and Medieval Warfare,
The West Point Military History Series

Dynamics in broad terms, are the driving physical, moral or intellectual forces of any area.¹² This concept applies directly to the concept of battle command. The vision of battle command held by General Sullivan and General Franks is a dynamic model. Their vision of battle command seeks to control the movement of change through the use of a controlled changed injected by the Army, the battle laboratories, and private industry.¹³

Battle command consists of three interrelated dynamics: leadership, technology and organization. Any serious student of warfare recognizes immediately that a dramatic shift in any one of these forces may be enough to create an asymmetrical relation between two conflicting forces. Yet change in one dynamic alone often does not achieve the desired effect. A cursory examination of military history demonstrates that when a balanced complementary shift occurs in all three

THE DYNAMICS OF BATTLE COMMAND



Figure 1.

dynamics at one time, a shift in the basic nature of war results. Thus creating the possible conditions for a decisive victory on the battlefield.

While the term battle command is new, the concept is not. The need for command in battle or battle command is the result of man seeking to control the violence of social conflict. An understanding of the historical development of battle command will aid in our analysis of future battle command requirements.

As chieftains led their tribes into battle they devised ways to command and control in combat. Competition and success acted as catalysts for change. In the same manner that man adapted to survive against nature, he adapted to survive and win in battle. Successful Stone Age chieftains, with the resources available, devised the optimal use of technology, leadership, and organizational structure to lead their forces to victory.¹⁴

TECHNOLOGY.

"In the military sense, technology is the application of science to war."¹⁵ Dr. James J. Schneider postulates that a significant paradox occurred as result of technology. He and others assert that as lethality, mobility, and stand-off distance increased that there was also a relative decline in the casualty rates. This phenomenon is what Dr. Schneider calls "The Theory of the Empty Battlefield." Three major factors provide evidence of the "Empty Battlefield": greater dispersion of troops, increased lethality of weapons, and a decline in relative casualties. The prediction by many military theorists is that the trend will continue.¹⁶ A fundamental concept of Force XXI power projection and contingency operations requires small units that are the combat equivalent of a much larger force. This economy of size is achieved through the use of technology to enhance the lethality, mobility, and survivability of Force XXI tactical units. As a result large Armies will become a thing of the past.¹⁷

THE THEORY OF THE EMPTY BATTLEFIELD




Figure 2.

A paradox exists between technology and battle command. Technology made combat more lethal yet more dispersed and difficult to control. Dispersion on the battlefield meant that the commander could no longer command and control his forces as he had in the past. Advancements in weapons technology mandated reciprocal advancements in command and control technology, leadership and organizational structures.

The telegraph, radio, telephone and satellite communications profoundly impacted upon the commander's ability to command and control forces over great distances. The telegraph allowed commanders to communicate with subordinates at corps level, in close to real time. The railroad enabled commanders to shift large forces quickly from one area of operation to another. Technological advancements such as the railroad, airplane, steamship and improved road networks decreased the time required to conduct sustainment operations. Computers reduced the time required to collect, process, analyze, and distribute information. These decreases in time affect all aspects of warfare to include: deployment, training, maneuver, detection, decisions, and execution. Time compressed as well for engagements, battles,

campaigns, and wars. Communication, computer, and transportation systems enable the commander to cope with the problems of extended space in decreased time.

Changes, in the dimensions of time and space work for and against the commander. The commander must take advantage of time more quickly than his opponent. Successful battle command requires the commander to possess the ability to dictate the tempo of operations to the opposing force. In order for the commander to accomplish this, improvements in leadership and organization must complement and take full advantage of emerging technology.

LEADERSHIP.

The term leadership as used in this monograph includes the elements of command, military art, genius, and education. The foundation of battle command is professional, competent leadership. "Leadership ... is the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result."¹⁸ Clausewitz equated command with genius. He maintained that even junior commanders must possess outstanding intellectual qualities.¹⁹ Clausewitz fashioned his discussion of genius by insisting it centered on a commander possessing *Coup D'oeil*. *Coup D'oeil* is the ability to recognize a truth on the battlefield in the "blink of an eye" that the ordinary mind will not comprehend or recognize until after extensive scrutiny.²⁰ *Coup D'oeil* or genius is the lubricant that enables a gifted commander to manipulate uncertainty and the fog of war to his advantage.

Clausewitz states that uncertainty is part of the environment of the war.²¹ He claimed that, "...three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped up in a fog, of greater or lesser uncertainty."²² Martin Van Creveld postulates in his book Command in War, that the essence of command is the ability to cope with uncertainty.²³ The battle

command dynamics of leadership, technology, and organizations assist the commander in reducing and coping with uncertainty on the battlefield. While striving to reduce uncertainty the Army must realize regardless of technological improvements that uncertainty is a constant. Van Creveld contends that neither technology nor organizational changes can significantly alter uncertainty on the battlefield. He states that the goal of eradicating uncertainty from the battlefield is an impossibility. He bases this assertion on two premises. One, contestants do not wage war in a rational, predictable manner. Two, the belligerents conducting war possess independent wills.²⁴

Technology does not guarantee certainty. While digitization of the battlefield will allow the future commander to see the battlefield with increasing clarity, it will not provide him an automated *Coup D'oeil*. The commander must still discern and recognize the true nature of what he sees on the battlefield. During the recent digitized rotation at the NTC the opposing force (OPFOR) was able to deceive the digitized task force as to the location of the OPFOR tank battalion by heating fiberglass replicas of the tank turrets. Low technological systems skillfully employed can often offset the advantages of high technological systems. As Clausewitz stated "In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts."²⁵

Van Creveld points out that as the art of warfare increased in complexities so did the art of command. The commander could not be everywhere at once. He had to depend more on his ability to lead through surrogates to maintain command and control. The complexities of command evolved with technology. Commanders and other leaders had to improve education, training, and organizations, not only to take advantage of emerging technology but, to keep from being overwhelmed by it.

ORGANIZATION.

The organizational component of battle command consists of force structure, educational and training institutions, and staff. Given its limited scope, this monograph will focus on the organizational aspects of the Heavy Task Force Battle Staff and its role as an enabling force in support of the battalion commander. Staffs evolved as a means for the commander to cope with uncertainty. "The military staff is essentially a professional institution which collects technical knowledge and applies it practically to the management of violence."²⁶ As war became more complex, chieftains sought counsel and advice from other members of their tribes. These war councils and advisors likely constituted the earliest military staffs.

James Hittle writes that the Egyptians probably created the first formalized military staff during the period 1600 to 1500 BC. Pharaoh Thothmes significantly improved his military capability through the use of a formalized staff. Thothmes organized his staff around the functional areas of intelligence and logistics. Reconnaissance played a central role in his campaigns. This is an early example of a commander's quest to reduce uncertainty.²⁷ Assyrian military power began to take shape around 700 BC. Sargon and his son, Sennacherib, used their staffs to improve the science of siege warfare; employing techniques such as battering rams, scaling ladders, siege artillery, and even mining operations.²⁸ The Persians later improved command coordination and planning based upon the foundation laid by the Egyptians and Assyrians. According to Xenophon, the Greek, historian-soldier, 435-355 BC, Darius of Persia successfully utilized his staff to coordinate joint naval and land operations.²⁹

As a result of its wars with Persia, the Greek states developed a high degree of joint operations between the army of Sparta and the Athenian fleet. During the Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 BC), the Army of Sparta fought against the Athenian fleet. The Athenians used

a command group of ten "*strategoi*". The ten were all equal in authority. Disagreements on the best way to conduct war was common and disruptive.³⁰ Julius Caesar used a similar command and staff system around 78 BC. His system consisted of six tribunes divided into groups of two. One set of two tribunes commanded for a specified period of time while the other four rotated staff functions. The command and staff positions rotated equally among the six tribunes. Each had one day on and then one day off. This rotation cycle facilitated time to rest, study, and prepare for command.³¹

During the Dark Ages the development of the staff slowed considerably.³² Gustavus Adolphus (King of Sweden, 1594 - 1632) and Pierre Alexandre Berthier of France (1753 - 1815) brought about major changes in staff organization. Hittle argues that these changes formed the basis of the modern staff. Gustavus Adolphus created the concept of logistical support by echelons. He understood the dramatic impact that proper organization could have upon war. In addition, he developed a permanent judge advocate section within the regimental staff and started the court marshal system.³³ Berthier's creation of additional positions, the adjutant general and chief of staff, significantly improved the Swedish staff model. He is largely credited as the creator of the Napoleonic staff. Berthier's staff organization is remarkably similar to the today's staff used by the United States. The current battle staff is a Napoleonic era model overlaid on a modern army force structure. Its primary function remains "...supporting the footsteps of the commander."³⁴

The most dramatic shifts in the nature of war are a result of a balanced relationship among the three dynamics of battle command, technology, leadership, and organization. There are several such examples in history. One such historical example is the synergistic effect of the dynamics of battle command achieved by Napoleon Bonaparte.

III -- THE BATTLE COMMAND DYNAMICS OF NAPOLEON

A most important point to be considered is that the revolutionary system of command employed by Napoleon was the outcome not of any technological advances, as one might expect but merely of superior organization and doctrine. The technical means at the emperor's disposal were not a whit more sophisticated than those of his opponents; he differed from them in that he possessed the daring ingenuity needed to transcend the limits that technology had imposed on commanders for thousands of years.

Martin Van Creveld
Command in War

The Napoleonic period resulted in a revolution in the nature of warfare. This change in the nature of war, while firmly guided by intellect, was a result of a combination of the dynamics of battle command (leadership, organization, and technology). An examination of the evolution of warfare leading up to the Napoleonic era demonstrates that Napoleon's achievements were largely due to his ability to visualize, orchestrate, and implement the changes that others designed and envisioned in isolation.

Napoleon successfully harnessed the individual efforts of civilian and military leaders of France. Like a great maestro, Napoleon was able to orchestrate the dynamics of battle command into full harmony by raising the level of leadership and organization to that of existing technology. Napoleon's dramatic revolution in the nature of war was a result of a complementary shift in all three dynamics enabling him to dominate the field of battle for nearly a quarter of a century.

TECHNOLOGY.

When one force has a tremendous technological advantage over an adversary, technology can be decisive. Neither Napoleon nor his enemies enjoyed a truly decisive technological advantage. Weapons-forging houses replaced individual artisans. This created an

economy of scale by standardizing weapons, reducing the time required for production, maintenance, and training. Similar economies of scale developed in other areas of manufacturing directly related to equipping the soldier and providing for the war effort. Huge stores containing stockpiles of equipment and supplies facilitated the support of mass armies. Specialized cannon foundries led to the development of fixed trunnions, lighter artillery pieces, and greater mobility through the use of caissons. The rate of fire, range and accuracy improved greatly. Mass production of artillery pieces by the foundries enabled the generals on the battlefield to experiment with the use of massed fires. In addition, it facilitated the employment of echelon fires at different levels of command.

Improvements in cartography allowed Napoleon to calculate movement rates. Maps facilitated significant improvements in command and control and allowed the general to make more detailed preliminary plans by conducting detailed map reconnaissance. This preliminary planning allowed him to start troop movement much earlier, sometimes on multiple routes to converge at the decisive point on the battlefield.

Bellamy argues that without communications; there can be no command, no control, no usable intelligence³⁵. Napoleon utilized his adjutant generals as a "directed telescope" to provide the extended vision of the battlefield that he needed. In addition to the extensive use of messengers he utilized the services of the wireless telegraph system within his empire.

LEADERSHIP.

This period was one of tremendous intellectual growth that contributed enormously to organizational development, technology, and the conduct of war at all levels. The professional army officer was born, as officers were appointed and promoted based on merit rather than nobility. Concerning this change, the French poet Voltaire stated: "the right of commanding is

no longer an advantage transmitted by nature; like an inheritance, it is the fruit of labors, the price of courage."³⁶

Napoleon as a leader possessed tremendous charisma, organizational skills, and vision. He was the embodiment of Clausewitz's "Genius". Genius is lubricant for friction. It is superior intellect focused. Genius enabled Napoleon to visualize the field of battle in terms of his situation and his opponent's. Even though Napoleon possessed natural genius as a practitioner of the military art, he also mastered the science of war. His genius enabled him to interconnect innovations created by others in the areas of organization and technology to achieve a systematic maturity. This coupling of individual dynamics produced a synergistic leveraging effect. The result was a dramatic change in the nature of war. As Bellamy states: "The genius of Napoleon therefore lay off the battlefield as much as on it."³⁷

ORGANIZATION.

This period was one of organizational enlightenment. The willingness to experiment with organizational changes produced a leap forward in the battle dynamic of organization that allowed Napoleon to take full advantage of existing technology. These organizational changes enhanced the army's tactical flexibility, decreased the commander's uncertainty on the battlefield, enhanced command and control, and gave France the ability to raise and support large scale armies.

Marshal Maurice de Saxe was an active participant in the evolution of military organization. He coupled professional military experience with visionary imagination. The result was his treatise My Reveries Upon the Art of War, published in 1732. Organizationally, he designed a self-sufficient divisional organization including regiments combining infantry (light and heavy) and cavalry (regular and Dragoons) and manpacked artillery. France continued to

experiment with the division organization and by 1790 began experimenting with a grouping of divisions into a corps organization. The Corps proved extremely flexible. By foraging they were able to move great distance much quicker and requiring fewer supply movements than the other armies of Europe.³⁸

Three others who made significant contributions in this area were Frederick the Great, the founder of the Prussian state (1620-1688), Pierre Bourcet, noted French staff officer (1700-1780), and the French general Guibert (1734-1790). Frederick the Great developed the technique of utilizing a skirmish force to fix the enemy, while utilizing maneuvering columns to the flanks to create the condition for decisive battle. Napoleon later perfected this technique. Frederick brought about dramatic improvements in employment of artillery.³⁹ Bourcet wrote his Principles de la guerre de montanges, while director of the Swiss staff school at Grenoble. He was instrumental in developing the concept of distributive maneuver to achieve overwhelming combat power (mass) at the decisive point on the battlefield. His writings focused on campaign planning and changed the nature of campaigns.⁴⁰ Guibert conceptualized a movement utilizing the column for the approach, then forming firing lines for the fight. This movement coupled with professionally drilled infantrymen, packed in tight formations produced devastating, controlled, firepower.⁴¹

Pierre Alexandre Berthier of France prescribed the basic staff organization that bears the name of Napoleon. Historians credit Berthier with the creation of the staff positions adjutant general and chief of staff.⁴² Another organizational factor that gave France a decided advantage was the levee en masse. This was a result of the Conscription Act of 1798. It allowed for both conscription and volunteers. The ability to raise enormous bodies of citizen


soldiers fighting for liberty, personal rights, and Napoleon presented a tremendous challenge to the monarchs of Europe.⁴³

SUMMARY.

Napoleon did not enjoy technological superiority. However, he was successful in harnessing the dynamics of battle command. He orchestrated a controlled, shift in each of the dynamics to achieve a synergistic balance. This created an asymmetrical relationship between Napoleon and the other armies of Europe. The most dramatic shifts in the nature of war are a result of complementary, balanced shift between all three dynamics (leadership, technology and organization). The decisive advantage one side enjoys due to an asymmetrical relation caused by a dramatic shift in one or all of the dynamics of battle command is normally short lived. As in the case of Napoleon, the enemy will seek to imitate success until he understands how the shift in power occurred. Napoleon created an asymmetrical relation between his forces and those of his enemies by properly emphasizing and orchestrated the three dynamics of battle command. Chapter four provides an analysis of the current heavy task force battle staff. The current staff is already struggling to function under "futuristic conditions" as the Army moves toward digitization of the battlefield.

IV -- ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT HEAVY TASK FORCE DOCTRINAL ORGANIZATION



This chapter provides an analysis of current heavy battalion staff's ability to meet the existing challenge of battle command. It examines two major problems that plague the current staff: doctrinal organization, and the lack of staff cohesion.

ORGANIZATION.

This section provides an analysis of the current task force staff organization focusing on the XO and the S3. The current doctrine does not adequately organize the staff to function in garrison the way it functions in the field. According to FM 71-2 The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, the XO has overall responsibility for the entire staff and direct responsibility for integration of CSS. The task force's other major, the S3, is responsible for the coordination of all CS elements.⁴⁴ In garrison he handles all direct coordination with CS elements, oversees the production of orders, and operates the emergency action cell. The XO handles all CSS coordination to include a tremendous amount of administrative work for the

battalion commander. In garrison, the battalion commander coordinates CS and tactical operations through the S3 and all CSS, to include personnel and logistical operations through the XO. The TOC is the domain of the combat support operations while the Combat Trains CP is the domain of CSS.

Unfortunately what seems to work in garrison falls apart once the battalion task force deploys to the field. The S3 normally assists the battalion commander forward during the fight while the XO is in charge of the TOC. The XO becomes responsible for the integration of CS, at least during the fight and the S4 becomes responsible for the integration of CSS. The problem is one of continuity and priorities.

CS Integration and Synchronization.

In a recent RAND report, Jan Grossman cites CS integration as a critical problem. Grossman asserts that one of most serious recurring problem with the integration of CS is what he terms the "dysfunctional working relationship" between the staff, particularly the S2 and S3.⁴⁵ This "dysfunctional working relationship" is a product of the current doctrinal organization of the task force staff. Doctrinally, the S2 works directly for the XO. However, a review of ARTEP 71-2 MTP, Mission Training Plan For The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, shows that the S3 is directly responsible for all coordination and integration of operations and intelligence operations. This includes responsibility for the reconnaissance and surveillance plan, and the ground tactical plan. The RAND report indicated that battalion ground tactical planning suffers due to S2s intelligence products not being completed in a timely manner.⁴⁶ The XO prioritizes the work of the S2. The priorities set by the XO often tend to reflect his focus on garrison operations. If the S2 and the S3 are to function as a team in the field, they must function as a team in garrison.

The S3 is directly responsible for the success or the failure of the TOC. The S2 and S3 sections form the basis of the TOC. The S3 in garrison controls the S3 section while the XO controls the S2 section. The S3 is normally responsible for TOC training in garrison yet when the TOC deploys the XO is responsible for TOC operations. The S3 section ends up working for both the XO and the S3 in the field. This often leads to conflicting guidance and frustration.

The XO, as the deputy commander, normally assumes command in the event of the battalion commander's death. However, when the commander dies at the CTCs, it is usually the S3 that assumes command. This is due to several factors: first, the S3 is already forward on the battlefield; second, the S3 has a fighting vehicle to command from; and third, the S3 as the operations officer is more familiar with the ground tactical plan and coordinating combat operations with the company commanders. Observations from the CTCs indicate that when the XO goes forward to assume command during the fight there is a problem maintaining operational tempo.⁴⁷

CTC observations indicate that the XO's span of control is too large. He is responsible for training the S1, S2, S3, S4, and the Battalion Motor Officer. In addition, he is responsible for integrating all CSS elements; the day to day operations of all personnel, logistical, maintenance, food services, health services; and the task force budget. The S3 is responsible only for the S3 shop and CS integration.

CSS Integration and Synchronization.

The NOV 92 CALL bulletin addressed logistics preparation of the battlefield. In the forward, General Nash, the Deputy Commanding General for Training, indicated that recent trends at the CTCs clearly show that CSS integration continues as a serious problem at the

task force level.⁴⁸ Nineteen ninety-one CALL data from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) indicate that 78 percent of the task forces observed needed substantial additional training in sustainment operations.⁴⁹

Former XOs interviewed by the author, indicated that they considered their mission at the TOC to be their critical task. As a result, they were often unable to manage CSS operations.⁵⁰ CTC observations establish that if the XO is doing a good job in the TOC, he probably is neglecting CSS. Conversely, if the XO is doing a good job managing CSS he probably is neglecting the TOC.⁵¹ There are exceptions, but they are rare.

Several former XOs vented frustration concerning their supervision and integration of CSS elements. They stated that supervising CSS activities while at the same time responsible for TOC operations proved extremely challenging. The same officers expressed a need to position the XO at the combat trains. This would facilitate improved synchronization of CSS and position senior leadership at the alternate TOC. As the commander's agent responsible for CSS operations, the XO should be able to concentrate on directing its management in the field. Like the commander and the S3, the XO needs the flexibility to position himself at the critical place on the battlefield (to direct the CSS efforts of the task force).⁵² Freeing the XO from the TOC empowers him to conduct critical CSS coordination with the brigade S4 and the forward support battalion. Brigade S4s and FSB commanders tend to be more responsive when approached by the battalion XO (MAJ) versus the battalion S4 (CPT or ILT).

The S4 in the field is responsible for CSS planning and integration, while the XO is at the TOC. The S4 is normally a junior captain who is waiting to take command. In most task forces he alone ends up being the responsible individual for the integration of CSS into the plan. While the S4 is doctrinally in charge, he must cope with being a leader among peers.

The average S4 or S1, prior to a CTC rotation, has received little training in planning critical operations such as mass casualties evacuation, mass replacement operations, prisoner of war operations, logistical packages (LOGPAC), forward prestocking, throughput, or rearm, refuel, and refit operations. Normal garrison operations do not prepare the CSS staff to perform their field missions. Home station training programs rarely include CSS elements. While this is a leadership problem, it is also a doctrinal problem. CTC observations indicate that the average battalion S4 and S1 require considerable additional functional area training subsequent to their arrival at the CTC.⁵³ CSS, like tactics, is a complex business. The difference is that the Army does a better job of emphasizing tactics than it does sustainment operations. The XO's doctrinal span of control is too large, resulting in the average XO being overwhelmed. The XO must have time to focus on the training needs of the S1 and the S4. As a result, field training often receives a lower priority than garrison operations. In 1992 the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) conducted a study on battalion battle staff training and synchronization. This report concluded that almost two-thirds of all CSS staff officers are untrained and ineffective.⁵⁴

The successful integration of CSS on the modern battlefield is paramount. CALL states that: "Commanders...must know the duration of their units' sustained combat power for the mission at hand, as well as the projected profile of the unit's fighting strength on the objective and for their 'be prepared' mission."⁵⁵ CSS is too critical not to have a field grade officer involved on a full time basis.

The current task force staff doctrinal organization tends to diffuse and complicate the task force staff's unity of effort. Junior company grade officers assume responsibility for CSS integration during the fight. The current staff organization generally does not provide the

commander with the freedom of action that he needs because he is busy trying to solve problems that the staff can not.

COHESION.

"Cohesion denotes the feeling of belonging and solidarity that occurs mostly at the primary group level and results from sustained interaction, both formal and informal among group members on the basis of common experience, interdependence and shared goals and values."⁵⁶

Staff Education and Training.

Preparation for a staff begins long before the first mission. It starts with the training of individual officers that constitute the staff. The branch schools, CAS³, and CGSC provide a fundamental overview of staff skills. Their respective curriculums do not cover the specialized skills required of a primary staff officer in a battalion. CSS special staff courses include, the S4's Logistics Management Course, the Battalion Personnel Officer's Course, and the Junior Maintenance Officer Course. Concerning specific training the JRTC study stated, "Few officers attended training courses because units either did not want to spare the training time or the commander was concerned that a trained staff officer would be transferred to a brigade or division staff rather than returned to the unit."⁵⁷ This is not an indictment of our schools or the chain of command, but food for thought. The chain of command must be cognizant that battalion level primary staff officers need additional training.

The JRTC study identified the lack of a formalized and protected home station training program, designed specifically for battalion commanders and staffs, as a major recurring deficiency.⁵⁸ The US. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences published a battalion battle staff training manual in response to this need.⁵⁹ Jan Grossman confirms the JRTC study.⁶⁰ Grossman found that while units planned home station staff training, that normally key members of the task force staff and the commander were unable to attend most

scheduled training.⁶¹ The Rand study indicates that 64 percent of task force staffs are untrained when they arrive at the CTCs.⁶²

Staff Planning.

The RAND study found that while 87 percent of the task force plans were executable, that only 65 percent of them were doctrinally, tactically, or technically, adequate to give the task force a good chance of defeating the OPFOR. Grossman concludes that planning is inadequate because most staffs are dysfunctional as a group. He contends that the lack of cohesion is serious problem for task force staffs. The ability to synchronize the complex functions and resources of a task force are dependent upon the staff being able to function as a cohesive body.⁶³

O/C observations from take-home packages indicate that intelligence and CSS input is normally late and inaccurate. Grossman states "that the two senior members of the TF [the commander and the S3, according to Grossman] typically try to make up for the lack of cohesion and training of the staff by doing most of the planning without input from the TF staff."⁶⁴ Plans generated without staff input fail to synchronize the battlefield operation systems.⁶⁵

Other common problems due to an ineffective staff include: weak course of action (COA) analysis, inflexible plans, war gaming occurring during the rehearsal, late changes to task organization, no plan to achieve mass at the desired point, and failure to synchronize. War gaming conducted at the rehearsal indicates that a COA was never truly selected. Failure to select a COA is largely due to a lack of staff training. This lack of training results in poor time management. Most task forces fail to use backwards planning to include "time lining" in order to meet their planning needs.⁶⁶

Battlefield Preparation.

The senior mechanized task force trainer at the NTC, identified time management as a key issue, that seriously hindered task force battlefield preparation, in 56 out of 60 AARs conducted in FY 1993 - 1994.⁶⁷ Survey data indicates that 88 percent of all task forces have serious difficulty in adequately managing the preparation of the battlefield. Preparation problems include: task organization changes not implemented, shortages of critical classes of supply, defensive obstacles not being emplaced, changes to plans and/or graphics not disseminated. The report states "to find a task force staff that is proactive in preparation management is rare."⁶⁸ Uncoordinated planning rarely produces coordinated preparation for battle.

The majority of task forces experienced serious problems due to lack of proper preparation, long before they engage the enemy or cross the line of departure (LD). Planning and preparation problems tend to compound and escalate, producing a snowball effect that often presents a more formidable foe than the opposing force (OPFOR). Task forces that can not manage battlefield preparation rarely execute missions to standard.

Mission Execution.

The RAND study indicates that the TF staff rarely influences the fight. The TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) during offensive missions is moving at the critical phase of the battle in one-third of the missions. The average staff fails to rehearse, breaking down the TOC, plan their moves, or practice operating the jump TOC, prior to executing split operations. The result is serious communication problems with higher headquarters at the worst possible time. This severely complicates the TF's ability to coordinate and direct CS and CSS assets during the critical periods.

Battle tracking is another serious problem for the staff during the battle. The commander should be able to rely on the TOC to provide the most accurate picture available. However, sixty percent of the time the TOC is unable to track the battle. This results in the staff not being able to analyze the fight to provide useful information to the TF commander. While the TOC should be able to monitor the reports they seldom are able to piece together a clear picture of the battle. This is due to a combination of poor training, poor positioning, and poor communications maintenance.⁶⁹

TF commanders and S3s on the battlefield have adjusted to poor battle tracking by the TOC. TOCs were only able to track the battle forty percent of the time. Yet, the commander and S3 were able to track the battle 67 percent of the time.⁷⁰ SPOT reports were normally directed to and pulled by either the commander or the S-3. The task force commander or the S3 requesting information initiated two-thirds of situation reports (SITREP).⁷¹ The commander has compensated for the failure of the TOC at his own expense. This takes away time he could devote to other matters. The task force commander or the S3 typically runs the net during the battle. This is because they direct the fight.

SUMMARY.

The current heavy task force staff organizational doctrine as reflected in FM 71-2 is defective. The Army can do a better job organizing the staff to fulfill its garrison and combat missions. The staff must be organized to support the needs of current and future heavy task force battalion commanders. The staff design should reflect the realities of the current and future operating environments.

Fifty percent of the task forces observed in FY 94 had one or more key individuals with less than two months in their jobs prior to the task force rotations.⁷² There is a direct linkage

between staff cohesion and staff performance. Most Divisions now have a policy that mandates a major to serve only in one position (either as S3 or XO) and for no longer than 12 to 18 months total in a battalion. This policy has significantly increased the turbulence within battalions. General (Retired) Donn A. Starry, TRADOC Commander, 1977 - 1981 stated the following concerning turbulence in the Army:

"In units, the greatest inhibitor to effective unit training is and so to unit readiness is personnel turbulence. We know pretty conclusively that once the turbulence rate rises above 20 percent per quarter, no meaningful training gets done. Yet many units show turbulence rates well over that threshold ... Personnel turbulence is the barrier that stands between ordinary units and excellent units ... At the heart of the turbulence problem is the individual replacement system ... it is a second-wave system in a third-wave world."⁷³

If the Army is serious about Force XXI it must fix its self-imposed personnel turbulence problem. In the meantime, dynamic, demanding, and realistic home station training is key to building a cohesive team. The chain of command from brigade through corps must recognize the void that exists in staff training. Senior leaders must take steps to ensure the battalion commander has adequate training opportunities to train his staff.


V -- THE DYNAMICS OF LEADERSHIP

It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first ... master his difficult art, he must learn to cut to the heart of the situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, requires long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions; the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.

COL. George C. Marshall
Infantry in Battle

THE EXPERIENCE GAP.

Force XXI recognizes that the genius of the commander is absolutely paramount. Current findings by the battle labs indicate that today's task force commanders fall short in measuring up to the desired attributes required of a Force XXI battle commander. The December 1994 "Infantry Branch Newsletter" stated that the next group of infantry battalion commanders will have an average of 54 months troop time. The Battle Command Battle Laboratory has expressed concern that the Army's future battalion commanders will have less opportunity for relevant operational assignments to prepare them for battalion command than their predecessors. This is largely due to the limited number of battalions. The majority of infantry battalion commanders are those that are below the zone selectees. Congressionally



mandated joint assignments and other assignment policies also limit the available time for future battalion commanders to serve with troops.

ECONOMIES OF TIME AND SPEED.

One of the biggest challenges future battalion commanders will face is maximizing time. Alfred Chandler, a noted corporate visionary, argues that as we move into the Twenty-First Century, leaders must take advantage of new economies, the "economies of time and speed."⁷⁴ Just as mass production brought about "economies of scales" the information age is responsible for the "economies of time." "Economies of time" mandate increased productivity and throughput. According to William H. Davidow and Michael S. Malone in their book The Virtual Corporation, the challenge facing leadership in the information age is to understand that organizations "that expect to remain competitive must quickly achieve mastery of both information and relationships." They argue that the information age mandates staffs that consist of highly skilled people who can analyze and utilize the new forms of complex information, in near real time.⁷⁵

The battalion commander of today must juggle a plethora of administrative demands that considerably hampers his freedom of action. The Army has allowed an informal system that mandates the battalion commander's personal attention. Subordinates could easily handle many of the things that consume a battalion commander's time. The commander ends up performing these tasks for three primary reasons: first, his superior mandates that he handles them personally; second, his staff is untrained; and third, he is uncomfortable delegating responsibility.

Let's consider the time a battalion commander consumes personally administering the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) at the field grade level. Battalion commanders

interviewed stated that it wasn't uncommon to spend 10 to 15 hours a week on administering UCMJ. The commander should delegate UCMJ authority for most cases to other field grade officers in the battalion. The governor of a state becomes involved in only the exceptional case. State governors do not become involved in the average case that goes before the state supreme court. If they did they would have little time to govern. The same argument applies to battalion commanders. Battalion commanders should personally become involved with the most critical cases. The designated field grade officer (s) would appraise the commander when a case warrants the commander's personal involvement. Unfortunately this simple fix would require a change in the UCMJ and the mind-set of military community. Too many Army officers suffer from the mind-set that command emphasis means that the commander must personally handle the situation.

BATTLE STAFF EMPOWERMENT.

The heavy task force commander of the Twenty-First Century must have freedom of action. The Army can no longer afford a battalion commander burdened by administrative minutia. Increased staff empowerment is essential to reduce the commander's burden. If empowerment is to work, the higher headquarters must respect the staff's authority to act behalf of the commander. The commander must be able to focus his attention on training and warfighting.

Consider the analogy of a football coach. Originally professional football teams had one coach. He was coach and staff. Coaching evolved as the complexities of the game did. When George Halas coached the Chicago Bears, he taught everything from blocking, punting, passing, to running. Supporting staffs evolved initially for logistical and medical support.

Times have changed significantly since the time of George Halas. Today's head coach has a staff that includes an assistant head coach, an offensive coordinator, a defensive coordinator, a back field coach, a defensive back coach, a quarterback coach, a wide receivers coach, a defensive line coach, an offensive line coach, and a special teams coach. The head coach empowers selected subordinate coaches to act directly on his behalf. Depending upon the head coach and his coaching staff he may call plays only by exception. This allows him to focus his attention. On the sideline, he is able to influence the action on the field by direct intervention at the decisive point. He maintains freedom of action. He sets his own agenda, focusing on the most critical aspect based upon his personal assessment.

Assistant coaches concentrate on training players. The head coach trains subordinate coaches. He has overall responsibility, but has surrounded himself with a group of highly professional coaches that have the same vision as he does. The head coach, not the front office, directs the training program. When the head coach changes jobs, he often takes his entire coaching staff with him. According to ST 101-5 the commander has the same flexibility:

"The commander uses rigorous, realistic training to build, mold, and shape his organization to assist him in this process, he selects his battle staff -- a small group of highly trained people. The battle staff helps anticipate the outcome of current operations and in developing the concept for the follow-on mission. They must understand and be able to apply a commonly understood doctrine in executing missions. They must also understand what information the commander deems important"⁷⁶

Battalion commanders seldom get to select their staff officers. This often results in the commander having to work with primary staff officers that do not jell with the organization or the commander. Due to the increased complexities and tempo of future operations staff empowerment will be even more critical in the future to enable the Force XXI commander to achieve successful battle command. If the Army's future battalion commanders are to cultivate

military genius and a firm grasp of the science and the art of war, it must provide the necessary tools and environment. The commander must have the opportunity to observe and contemplate, rather than running from one event to the next. The Army must surround the commander with a robust, cohesive staff, skilled in problem solving, information analysis and management, and capable third-order thinking.⁷⁷

VI -- FORCE XXI HEAVY TASK FORCE BATTLE STAFF ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Force XXI requires a heavy task force staff capable of conducting operations in extended battlespace. The future TOC will be similar to an air-traffic control station with computer screen projected situational awareness. It will serve as a weapons system clearing platform. The staff will manage the employment of a variety of types of weapon systems from mortar brilliant munitions to spacebased missiles within the battalion's battlespace. The staff will determine and orchestrate various sensor - shooter combinations within the task force's battlespace. These high tech battle aids will mandate periodic staff training.

The key limiting factor to Force XXI is human endurance.⁷⁸ While TRADOC PAM 525-5, Future Operations, predicts that we must be able to fight on a continuous basis, the current staff organization does not support this. Today's staff is only one person deep. It was designed to function primarily from sun up to sun down. The staff's lack of depth in staff personnel hinders the task force's ability to fight on a continuous basis. The intent for Force XXI is to maximize the "economies of speed and time" and dictate the tempo of the battle, thus requiring the capability of conducting, sustained, continuous operations. A robust staff with depth at the critical positions will enable Force XXI to continue to operate while the enemy has culminated.

The staff must assume more of the burden from the battalion commander. The staff must function in garrison the same as it functions in the field. The chain of command must empower the Force XXI battle staff to make more decisions on behalf of the commander, in line with his intent.

The Force XXI heavy task force requires a robust command and control system that enables the commander to dominate his battle space through the synergistic effect achieved

through the proper balance of battle command dynamics. The staff and higher headquarters must provide the commander freedom to exercise the art of command.

The success of the Force XXI battle staff will depend on its ability to gather and integrate a massive flow of information and apply it intelligently on the battlefield in a timely manner. Indications are that staff training is going to be even more critical in the future than in the past or the present.⁷⁹

The Force XXI staff must maintain a constant effort to force the will of the commander on the enemy force. On the basis of the commander's intent and vision the staff must dictate the tempo of operations. It is essential that the battle staff anticipate events so the task force can act and react faster than the enemy. A precondition for battle command success is the staff's ability to understand the causes and effects necessary for planning simultaneous and sequential operations in terms of time, space, resources and purpose.

Force XXI heavy task forces will conduct missions across the full spectrum of military operation. This requires a highly educated and trained staff. The staff must be a cohesive group capable of conducting detailed and accurate analysis in a short period of time. While technology enhances the staff's ability to gather intelligence, track supplies, and analyze information, it is ultimately the staff that must master the technology to make it a useful tool for battle command.

Emerging communications and computer equipment while user friendly is extremely complex. The days of the battalion signal officer (SIGO) pulling extra duty as the computer systems manager is passed. Digitization requires the implementation of rigorous standards for communications and computer maintenance and training. The digitized rotation 94-07, at the NTC, demonstrated the need for a heavy task force information manager as part of the task

force staff.⁸⁰ A commissioned officer or a warrant officer could fill this position. He will be responsible for information management, systems training and maintenance.

The Force XXI heavy task force staff must be capable of considering the current and future fight simultaneously.⁸¹ The TOC must function seamlessly, fighting the current battle while planning the future battle. Many officers collapsed at the end of desert storm from exhaustion and lack of sleep.⁸² In continuous operations, the commander and his key staff must have alternates (seconds) that can pick up the battle and continue to press the fight while the primaries rest.

This requires personnel at the high end (higher ranks or experience) of the staff. Additional junior officers, warrant officers or senior NCOs could be used to provide additional depth at key positions. Warrant officers offer a unique capability. The addition of warrant officers in the areas of operations, intelligence, information, logistics and personnel would provide the required depth, knowledge, and experience to enable a Force XXI task force to function continuously. Warrant officers could stay in a battalion for a longer period of time providing stability, continuity, and insight to incoming primary staff officers.

The battle staff must know and understand the intent of the commander. This requires a period of serving together to develop a working knowledge and understanding of how the commander thinks. It is hard for staff officers to know the intent of a commander they just met. Detailed standard operating procedures can aid in bringing a staff officer up to speed on the commander's intent for various types of operations. According to the authors of the battle command course at Fort Leavenworth "the staff must be an extension of the commander, see things as he does, and share his responsibility for the mission..."⁸³

To capture the essence of the staff as an extension of the commander the Battle Command Battle Laboratory at Fort Leavenworth Kansas coined the phrase battle support teams. The battle support teams not only must share a common vision with the commander but must have a sense of ownership and shared responsibility. Force XXI battle support teams focus on synthesizing information and anticipating future requirements.

While many anticipate that the future staff will be smaller it will require a greater depth of highly experienced, trained, and educated officers to fulfill the vision of Force XXI. One of the most ardent debates currently going on is whether or not digitization of the battlefield will significantly decrease the workload of the task force staff or merely change it. The digitization of the battlefield will provide the commander and his staff with greater volume of accurate information. This greater volume of information can be a blessing or a curse. The staff organization must be such that it can take advantage of it. "Staffs must establish procedures to shift through ever increasing quantities of available information and provide rapid staff assessment"⁸⁴

VII -- FORCE XXI HEAVY TASK FORCE BATTLE STAFF OPTION

PROPOSED FORCE XXI HEAVY TASK FORCE BATTLE STAFF




CHART 2.

The Army must acknowledge the problems that exist with the current staff organization and decide how to solve them. One option is to create a heavy task force staff that consists of four field grades versus the current three. The field grades of the battalion would be as follows: Battalion Commander (LTC), Deputy Battalion Commander (LTC [replaces the XO]), Chief of Maneuver (CMAN, MAJ, S3), Chief of Logistics (CLOG, MAJ, S4).

COHESION.

The Deputy Battalion Commander (DBC) is truly a deputy commander. He has overall responsibility for the synchronization and integration of all CS and CSS elements. The battalion CMAN (S3) is responsible for the synchronization of all CS elements, while the battalion CLOG (S4) is responsible for the synchronization of all CSS elements. If the staff is going to be

a cohesive unit in the field, it must train and operate the same way in garrison as it does in the field. This option delineates responsibilities in garrison and in the field by functional areas in CS or CSS. It reduces frustration by establishing and maintaining a unity of effort. At the same time it balances and streamlines the span of control responsibilities.

Staff Education and Training.

The DBC is overall responsible for the training of the task force staff. He works directly through his primary subordinates the CMAN (S3) and the CLOG (S4). The battalion CMAN (S3) assumes direct responsibility for the battalion S2. The S2 retains his own shop and is a primary staff officer. This facilitates direct communication between the S2 and the S3. This enables greater unity of effort in the TOC and enhances interoperability between the S2 and the S3. The CMAN is responsible for the training of the S2. This will ensure greater cross-talk between the S2 and the S3. The S3 is the officer responsible for all TOC operations. The battalion CLOG (S4) assumes responsibility for the training and synchronization of all CSS elements just as he currently does in the field. The assistant S4 (CPT) works for the CLOG, in the same manner the S3 air works for the CMAN (S3). The CLOG (S4) is responsible for the combat trains command post. The S1 and the assistant S4 work for the CLOG (S4) in the CTCP.

Staff Planning.

The DBC is overall responsible for insuring that the heavy task force's plan integrates and synchronizes all battlefield operating systems to include the elements of CS and CSS. The CMAN is directly responsible for the ground tactical plan and the integration and synchronization of all CS elements. The CMAN is chief of the TOC. As such, he is responsible for orders production. The CMAN oversees and directs the planning of all intelligence products through the S2. The CLOG is chief of the alternate TOC, located at the combat

trains command post (CTCP). He collates all CSS staff estimates at the CTCP, then provides direct input to the orders process at the TOC. The DBC ensures linkage between CS and CSS elements.

Battlefield Preparation

The DBC is overall responsible for the management of battlefield preparation. The CMAN centrally tracks battlefield preparation from the TOC. The Commander, DBC, and the CLOG monitor the preparation of the battlefield ensuring execution in accordance with the commander's vision. The TOC maintains a status board detailing the status of critical areas of battlefield preparation. These areas include: the sighting and execution of all obstacles, number of survivability positions dug, unit locations, numbers of brilliant munitions available, intelligence updates provided by unmanned and space-based platforms, status of sensors, Weapon system platforms available, status of rehearsals, task organization link up status, ammunition, fuel, operational readiness and personnel status. The assistant S4 at the CTCP tracks the status of all classes of supply and all pertinent support status to include those tracked by the TOC.

Mission Execution.

The DBC, as the 2IC, goes forward on the battlefield at the second most critical point. If the commander dies or loses contact during the fight the DBC immediately assumes command.. He is already forward in a combat vehicle and knowledgeable of the situation. He has the operational experience and education that will enable the battalion to maintain operational tempo.

The CMAN causes the radio platform of the TOC to coordinate and integrate the combat support with the battalion and is responsible for CS coordination and reporting to brigade. The S2 and CMAN (S3) track the battle, analyze the current fight and provide recommendations and assessments to the commander. The TOC must operate in a reduced

mode during the fight. The S3 ensures the TOC is fully capable of battle tracking and analysis in a reduced mode (ready to move immediately). The CMAN personally plans the movement of the TOC to assure that the TOC is set (ready) and fully capable of tracking and analyzing the battle at the critical time.

The CLOG tracks the battle from the combat trains command post. Like the TOC, the CTCP must also operate during the battle in the reduced mode. The CLOG monitors CSS operations during all phases of the operations and personally insures that the CTCP is tracking the battle and ready to perform its role as the alternate TOC. His focus is on sustainment operations. The CLOG can move between the Battalion Aid Station, Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) or the unit trains. This enables a field grade officer to be at the critical point on the battlefield for the coordination of CSS assets. The CLOG focuses his primary attention on supervising, trouble shooting, and fixing the many complexities of the CSS that could shortstop the battalion commander's ability to execute the plan.

CONCLUSION.

Napoleon successfully orchestrated the dynamics of battle command by matching organizational and leadership requirements with technological advancements. For the US Army, the problem is how to enhance and maximize its commanders' leadership abilities so they can execute effective battle command on an increasingly dispersed battlefield. The Army must place as much emphasis on fixing problems in the dynamics of leadership and organization as it does in technology. The heavy task force battle staff organization directly affects the capability and effectiveness of the entire leadership of the task force. The current organization falls short in several critical areas to include: unity of effort, span of control, consistency of roles in garrison and the field, ability to perform continuous operations, ability to maintain operational

tempo in the event of the loss of the commander or the TOC, a lack of leadership depth on the battlefield, and the lack of senior leadership management of CSS elements in the field.

The option presented in this chapter significantly enhances the battalion commander's ability to train his unit in garrison and the field. The DBC provides the battalion commander with a wide breadth of experience, tactical expertise, and education. He provides the battalion commander with greater freedom of action. The DBC slot not only significantly enhances the readiness of the task force, it enhances the readiness of the Army by providing an extremely relevant operational position. The DBC could be a battalion commander designee or a more senior LTC who is on the command bubble.

The division of labor between the CMAN (S3) and the CLOG (S4) improves the span of control issues and facilitates communication, focused training, and unity of effort. It ensures that CSS elements receive as much attention as CS. The information manager is a position whose time has come. A shadow staff provides additional continuity and a continuous operations capability.

Just as the Army seeks to gain the technological initiative it must seek to gain the initiative in leadership and organization. The option presented in this chapter fixes the problems of the current staff and provides at least a good transitional staff for the future. It allows the battalion commander time to cultivate and exercise the genius required in the Force XXI vision -- much like Napoleon did a few hundred years ago. The word dynamic implies movement. The Army must develop the dynamics of leadership and organization in pace with technology to ensure the US Army's Force XXI achieves its goal of being the most capable land force on the planet in the 21st century.

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